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Abstract
While natural language understanding (NLU)
is advancing rapidly, today’s technology dif-
fers from human-like language understanding
in fundamental ways, notably in its inferior
efficiency, interpretability, and generalization.
This work proposes an approach to represen-
tation and learning based on the tenets of em-
bodied cognitive linguistics (ECL). According
to ECL, natural language is inherently exe-
cutable (like programming languages), driven
by mental simulation and metaphoric map-
pings over hierarchical compositions of struc-
tures and schemata learned through embodied
interaction. This position paper argues that the
use of grounding by metaphoric inference and
simulation will greatly benefit NLU systems,
and proposes a system architecture along with
a roadmap towards realizing this vision.
1 Introduction
“Not those speaking the same language,
but those sharing the same feeling under-
stand each other.” – Jalal ad-Din Rumi
While current NLU systems “speak” human lan-
guage by learning strong statistical models, they
do not possess anything like the rich mental repre-
sentations that people utilize for language under-
standing. Indeed, despite the tremendous progress
in NLU, recent work shows that today’s state-of-
the-art (SOTA) systems differ from human-like lan-
guage understanding in crucial ways, in particular
in their generalization, grounding, reasoning, and
explainability capabilities (Glockner et al., 2018;
McCoy et al., 2019a,b; Nie et al., 2019; Yogatama
et al., 2019; Lake et al., 2019).
Question-answering (QA) is currently one of
the predominant methods of training deep-learning
models for general, open-domain language under-
standing (Gardner et al., 2019b). While QA is a ver-
satile, broadly-applicable framework, recent stud-
ies have shown it to be fraught with pitfalls (Gard-
ner et al., 2019a; Mudrakarta et al., 2018). A recent
workshop on QA for reading comprehension sug-
gested that “There is growing realization that the
traditional supervised learning paradigm is broken
[...] – we’re fitting artifacts” (Gardner, 2019).
In many respects, the problems of NLU mirror
those of artificial intelligence (AI) research in gen-
eral. Lake et al.’s (2017a) seminal work identified
a significant common factor at the root of problems
in general AI. The current deep-learning paradigm
is a statistical pattern-recognition approach predom-
inantly applied to relatively narrow task-specific
prediction. In contrast, human cognition supports
a wide range of inferences (planning, action, ex-
plaining, etc.), hinting at a view of intelligence fo-
cused on model-building, specifically, mental mod-
els: rich, structured, manipulable, and explainable
representations useful for performing in dynamic,
uncertain environments. This distinction motivates
the quest for a new cognitively-inspired model-
building learning paradigm for general AI, which
has inspired fruitful subsequent research and dis-
cussion (e.g., Lake et al. (2017b)).
The observation that NLU and general AI share a
common central problem (task-specific prediction-
based learning), and the growing realization that
deeper text understanding requires building men-
tal models (Gardner et al., 2019a; Forbes et al.,
2019), motivate the search for an NLU analog of
the cognitively-inspired model building paradigm.
Amid recent position papers highlighting signif-
icant differences between human language under-
standing and current NLU systems (McClelland
et al., 2019; Bisk et al., 2020), here we take a more
focused look at mental models; challenges arising
due to their embodied nature, their importance in
general NLU, and how we might begin integrating
them into current approaches.
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Mainstream NLU work, be it entirely distribu-
tional, such as BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), or also
involving symbolic knowledge representation (Liu
et al., 2019a; Bosselut et al., 2019), seldom ad-
dresses mental models directly. Crucially, such ap-
proaches lack the interactive worlds within which
mental models1 are learned jointly through lan-
guage and embodied action. The most closely
related lines of work to the present proposal are
grounded approaches, which feature worlds in the
form of interactive environments, and address map-
ping text to programs (executable semantic parses)
(e.g., Gauthier and Mordatch, 2016; Liang, 2016;
Kiela et al., 2016; Chevalier-Boisvert et al., 2019).
However, while well-aligned with a model-building
paradigm, typically such approaches have been lim-
ited to short or synthetic literal language and nar-
row domains assuming predefined environments.
Embodied approaches to general NLU, as advo-
cated here, are few and far between. Mostly, exam-
ples fall under the construction grammar frame-
work (Steels and de Beule, 2006; Bergen and
Chang, 2005). However, despite their intellectual
merit, they were not operationalized to scale readily
for mainstream applications (see §3).
This position paper argues that executable se-
mantic parsing and grounded approaches to NLU
constitute a first step in a much larger program,
whose outline is set forth, for general language un-
derstanding through embodied cognitive linguis-
tics (ECL). Following much cognitive science re-
search (see §3, §4), this paper posits that (1) execu-
tion or simulation is a central part of semantics,
essential for addressing some of the persistent diffi-
culties in text understanding, and (2) metaphoric
inference capabilities are central to knowledge
representation, and facilitate grounded understand-
ing of general language. Importantly, capacities for
both simulation and metaphor are emergent, borne
of embodied interaction within an external world.
Our contributions are: we analyze inherent limi-
tations of SOTA statistical language models applied
to NLU and propose a framework to address these
limitations. The novelty of this approach stems
from bringing together ideas from the cognitive
science literature, the general-AI community, and
NLU. This framework constitutes a path to general-
ize current execution-based methods towards more
general language understanding.
1Typically, mental models are construed as “world simula-
tors”; see §3.
The world contains 2 crates. Each crate contains 4 boxes.
Oranges and apples are objects. Each box may contain up
to 5 objects. Objects can be moved from one box to
another. Objects can be removed from boxes or crates.
There are two apples in the first box in the first crate. There
is one orange and one apple in the second box of the
second crate. First, the apples were transfered from the first
box of the first crate to the first box of the second crate.
Next, all apples were removed from the second crate.
Initial World State
C1 C2
Figure 1: Open-domain challenge – a world with
boxes, crates and objects.
This paper proposes a system architecture and a
roadmap towards implementing the vision outlined
here, suggesting preliminary directions for future
work (learned world models, incorporating interac-
tion into datasets). We believe that this framework
will facilitate consolidation with multiple related
lines of research across the different communities.
2 Challenges for Current NLU Systems
This section presents concrete example problems
demonstrating inherent limitations in SOTA NLU.
2.1 Open-domain Literal Language
Simulation
Fig. 1 includes a short story about a world with
crates, boxes, and objects inside them. It is a short
and simple narrative, far from capturing the full-
blown complexity of natural language. Following
Gardner et al. (2019a), we assume that a system
understands the story if it can correctly answer ar-
bitrary questions about it. To do so requires basic
commonsense and mathematical reasoning, refer-
ent grounding, tracking events, handling declara-
tive knowledge, and more.
The task is similar to narrative comprehension
tasks in datasets such as bAbI (Bordes et al., 2015)
and SCONE (Long et al., 2016), and could be
solved given large amounts of annotated training
data. But, the goal here is different, specifically, to
develop models that, like humans, can understand
such language on-the-fly (like zero-shot learning).
QA approaches. Current QA systems, used in
an off-the-shelf manner, do not generalize well
to tasks on which they have not been trained;
NLU models are known to be brittle even to slight
changes in style and vocabulary (Gardner et al.,
2020; Keysers et al., 2020). The closest QA setting
is the DROP challenge (Dua et al., 2019), requiring
reading comprehension and basic numerical reason-
ing over paragraphs. As a simple sanity check, we
tested a near-SOTA model and baseline2 on this ex-
ample, asking questions about the initial and final
state. The models were notably better answering
questions about the initial state than about the final
state. This result is perhaps expected, as the an-
swers to questions about the initial state are closer
to the input text. Answering questions about later
states is more challenging. A key missing compo-
nent of these systems is the ability to simulate the
effects of actions, especially commonsense effects
(e.g., moving a container moves the elements in it).
Executable semantic parsing approaches. The
problem of Fig. 1 could also naturally be cast as an
executable semantic parsing (ex. SP) task. Simi-
lar tasks already exist, for example, the “Alchemy”
sub-task of the SCONE dataset features beakers of
chemicals that are mixed, poured, and drained. Exe-
cutable approaches can leverage simulation to learn
structured world models, but are limited by hard-
coded, domain-specific executors; adding tasks re-
quires substantial manual effort.
For humans, through largely subconscious
metaphorical inference (related to transfer and
meta-learning in general AI (Lake et al., 2017a)),
it is obvious that both SCONE and Fig. 1 share
much the same structure. This similarity allows for
effortless generalization, effectively re-purposing
a relatively simple executor (for literal language)
flexibly across many tasks.
2.2 Non-literal Language
The previous challenge involved literal language,
amenable to symbolic execution. However,
non-literal language is pervasive in everyday
speech (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Consider the
example in Fig. 2: the phrase “head of the French
Army” is non-literal, implying that the army can
be treated as a human body. The execution seman-
tics of verbs like “attacked” and “defend” are also
non-literal; they are highly contextual, requiring
interpretation beyond word-sense disambiguation
alone. “Russian hackers attacked the Pentagon
networks” or “The senator attacked the media” en-
tail very different simulations. This ambiguity is
challenging for non-neural (symbolic) simulation-
based approaches. Humans compose a structured
2Segal et al. (2019) and Dua et al. (2019), respectively.
COUNTER FORCE
French Army
Napoleon
HEAD of
Attack
FORCE, MOTION Fort
BODY
LOCATION
"Napoleon, the head of the French Army, attacked the 
Russian fort,      but found it well defended
and had to turn back."
Russian Army
HEAD of
French Army
Russian Army
Fort
BODY ABORTED ACTION
Napoleon
HEAD of
Defend
French Army
Russian Army
Fort
BODY
1
2
3
1
2
3
LOCATION
LOCATIONNapoleon
Figure 2: Non-literal language challenge. To un-
derstand this sentence, humans rely on metaphoric in-
ference over embodied concepts (in blue, also called
schema; see §3). For example, here “attack” evokes a
FORCE or MOTION schema, used to construct a men-
tal model of the scene via mental simulation (§4).
mental model from the language through schemata
and mental simulation, as discussed in §3,§4.
To summarize, the limitations outlined above
motivate the attempt to extend the capability of
simulation to general linguistic inputs. Doing so
would enable the construction of grounded, manip-
ulable, and interpretable representations from text.
Two desiderata follow from the challenges: (1)
more flexible utilization of symbolic executors by
exploiting shared (analogical) structures between
texts (§2.1), and (2) learned, neural executors for
non-literal language comprehension (§2.2).
3 Embodied Cognitive Linguistics: A
Model Building Paradigm
Turning to cognitive science for inspiration, we fo-
cus on embodied cognitive linguistics (ECL), an im-
portant paradigm directly addressing both desider-
ata. This section presents a brief overview and key
tenets of ECL, specifically the theoretical founda-
tions Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Feldman
and Narayanan (2004) developed. Most contem-
porary cognitive accounts of language incorporate
concepts from ECL to some degree. A full review
is out of scope of this work; see Ga¨rdenfors (2014)
and §4,§5 for discussion in the NLU context.
Early cognitive theories assumed a disembod-
ied, symbolic representation of knowledge (Lewis,
1976; Kintsch and Van Dijk, 1978), separate from
the brain’s modal systems (vision, motor con-
trol, etc.). In contrast, the embodied cognition
(EC) view, based on widespread empirical find-
ings, focuses on the role of the body in cogni-
tion. In this view, knowledge is stored using multi-
modal representations (mental imagery, memories,
etc.) that arise from embodied experience and ac-
tion in the world (Barsalou, 2008; Proffitt, 2006).
ECL postulates that linguistic representations and
other, higher-level cognitive functions are deeply
grounded in neural modal systems (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Barsalou, 2008). This view is com-
pelling, as it addresses the grounding problem (Har-
nad, 1990) by linking between high-level symbolic
constituents of mental representations and experi-
ence or action in the physical world (Varela et al.,
2017). Note that embodiment is far from an end-all
for language comprehension: for example, social
and cultural aspects too are crucial (Arbib et al.,
2014). Still, ECL laid important conceptual foun-
dations also underlying subsequent accounts:
• Embodied schemata: Pre-linguistic structures
formed from bodily interactions and recurring
experience, such as CONTAINMENT, PART-
WHOLE, FORCE, MOVEMENT (Langacker,
1987; Talmy, 1985, 1983).
• Metaphoric inference:3 The process by which
new information may be inferred via structural
similarities to a better-understood instantiated
system (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gallese and
Lakoff, 2005; Day and Gentner, 2007). For ex-
ample, “I have an example IN mind” suggests
that the abstract concept mind is mapped to the
more concrete domain of containers.
• Mental simulation. The reenactment of per-
ceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired
during experience with the world, body, and
mind. In EC, diverse simulation mechanisms
(also called mental or forward models (Rumle-
hart et al., 1986; Grush, 2004)) support a wide
spectrum of cognitive activities, including lan-
guage and decision making (Barsalou, 2008).
We believe that ECL is a useful paradigm for
addressing the challenges of §2, as it articulates
the role of analogy and mental simulation in NLU.
The following two ECL hypotheses summarize
them (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Feldman and
3Also called analogical reasoning, we use “metaphorical”
and “analogical” interchangeably.
Narayanan, 2004):
Hypothesis 1 (Simulation): Humans understand
the meaning of language by mentally simulating its
content. Language in context evokes a simulation
structured by embodied schemata and metaphoric
mappings, utilizing the same neural structures for
action and perception in the environment. Under-
standing involves inferring and running the best
fitting simulation.
Hypothesis 2 (Metaphoric Representation):
Human concepts are expressible through hierarchi-
cal, compositional, metaphoric mappings over a
limited vocabulary of embodied schema. Abstract
concepts are expressed using more literal concepts.
Early ECL Implementations. Early attempts to
implement ECL in actual language understand-
ing systems were founded on Narayanan (1997)’s
x-schema simulation framework and Embodied
Construction Grammar (Bergen and Chang, 2005).
While notable for approaching challenging prob-
lems involving mental simulation, and complex,
metaphoric language, early implementation efforts
were not operationalized to scale to mainstream
applications (Lakoff and Narayanan, 2010). These
works also focused on a particular type of sim-
ulation (sensorimotor), understood as only one
mechanism of many used in language understand-
ing (Stolk et al., 2016).
FrameNet (Ruppenhofer et al., 2016) and
MetaNet (David and Dodge, 2014) are closely
related projects in that each provides an exten-
sive collection of schemata used in everyday and
metaphoric language comprehension, respectively,
via the concept of a semantic frame (Fillmore,
1985). However, neither incorporates simulation
semantics, as needed for a full realization of the
ECL vision (Chang et al., 2002).
4 Linking ECL to NLU and Embodied
AI Research
We propose a unifying view of ECL, bringing it
closer to contemporary cognitive science and deep
learning approaches. This section presents nota-
tions and motivating intuitions, further developing
the computational framework in §5,§6. The pro-
posal centers around the view of natural language
as a kind of neural programming language (Lupyan
and Bergen, 2016), or higher-level cognitive con-
trol system for systematically querying and induc-
ing changes in the mental and physical states of
Concept Symbolic ECL Embodied AI
Primitives Basic data structures,
operators, variables...
Schemata: MOVE,
CONTAINER,
PART-WHOLE... Deep neural world &
action representations
(learned through interaction)
Knowledge Organization a) Composition, inheritence
b) Libraries
a) Hierarchical,
compositional metaphoric
mappings
b) Compiled Knowledge
Executable Unit Instruction Semantic parse a˜
Execution Trace Intermediate program states Mental models T˜ (s˜, a˜)
Simulation Executor Emulator† T˜
Semantic parsing /
grounding
Parser to executable
symbolic program
Parser to executable neural
program
O−1, pi
Table 1: Natural language as a neural programming language conceptualization, with correspondence between
symbolic programming, ECL, and embodied AI, using standard POMDP notation. Tilde notation refers to internal
counterparts of T, s, a used in mental simulation.
†Also called mental simulation (Bergen and Chang, 2005), we adopt emulator (Glenberg, 2008) to conform with
contemporary cognitive science accounts.
recipients (Elman, 2004; Stolk et al., 2016; Borghi
et al., 2018). This approach builds on the ECL
hypotheses and suggests a broader view of mental
simulation, one that is readily amenable to the same
computational formulation as current embodied AI
and executable semantic parsing approaches.
Preliminaries. At the core of embodied ap-
proaches is the Partially Observable Markov De-
cision Process (POMDP; Kaelbling et al., 1998).
It governs the relations between states (s), actions
(a), observations (o), and rewards (r). Of particular
interest are the recognition O−1 : O → S, policy
pi : S → A, and transition T : S × A → S func-
tions. Focusing on mental simulation rather than
actual external action, we assume a degree of equiv-
alence between external and internal representa-
tions (Rumlehart et al., 1986; Hamrick, 2019). We
consider internal mental states and actions (s˜, a˜),
effecting change to mental models via a learned
neural emulator T˜ (Grush, 2004). Finally, lan-
guage is considered a form of action (Glenberg,
2008) via external and internal utterances (i.e., se-
mantic parses).
Connecting symbolic & embodied language un-
derstanding. Table 1 presents a structured version
of the neural programming language conceptualiza-
tion. Importantly, this view highlights the impor-
tant commonalities and differences between ECL
and both symbolic programming languages, as
well as embodied neural mechanisms, for percep-
tion and action. We illustrate these relations more
explicitly through a comparison between ECL and
executable semantic parsing (Table 1, bottom).
Executable semantic parsing. Involves parsing a
novel linguistic input o into a symbolic program
a, whose execution4 yields a desired goal state:
T
(
O−1 (o) ,a
)
= s∗. Executable semantic pars-
ing focuses on action in an external, symbolic en-
vironment T , and typically doesn’t address T˜ , e.g.,
mapping a natural language question o directly to
an executable query a on an SQL engine T .
ECL semantic parsing. Shares the same structure
as executable semantic parsing, with the impor-
tant distinction that simulation is enacted via inter-
nal neural representations: T˜
(
O−1 (o) , a˜
)
= s˜∗.
The fully neural formulation enables grounded un-
derstanding of non-literal language, demonstrated
here for the Fig. 2 example. Metaphoric infer-
ence (hyp. 2) facilitates parsing a novel linguis-
tic input o into internal, structured, neural state
representations s˜, a˜. Accordingly, the utterance
u=“Napoleon, the head of the French Army” might
be parsed to an internal state s˜ composed of a PART-
WHOLE schema as shown in the figure. The phrase
“attacked the Russian fort” could be grounded to
a parse a˜ driving simulation over MOTION and
FORCE schemata. The requirement that s˜ and a˜
should afford mental simulation (hyp. 1) by the
neural world emulator T˜ marks an important dif-
ference from current neural word embeddings, one
that contributes to deeper language understanding;
in the resulting mental model T˜ (s˜, a˜), Napoleon
and the French Army likely moved together due
to the PART-WHOLE relation between them. This
inference is non-trivial since it requires implicit
4Slightly abusing notation, we apply T iteratively on a
sequence of actions a = (a0, ..., aL−1).
knowledge (heads and bodies often move together).
Indeed, a SOTA NLI model5 considers it “very
likely” that the Fig. 2 sentence contradicts the en-
tailment that “The French Army moved towards
the fort but did not enter it.” To summarize:
• Executable semantic parsing approaches address
grounding literal language to symbolic primi-
tives; and metaphoric inference suggests a mech-
anism for grounding general language using
neural primitives (schemata).
• Executable semantic parsing approaches uti-
lize hard-coded, external symbolic executors,
whereas ECL highlights the role of learned neu-
ral world emulators, as in current embodied
research AI efforts (see §7.2).
5 Proposal for an Embodied Language
Understanding Model
Formalizing the view characterized above suggests
a novel computational model of language under-
standing. While current statistical models focus
on the linguistic signal, research shows that most
of the relevant information required for under-
standing a linguistic message is not present in the
words (Stolk et al., 2016; David et al., 2016). Ac-
cordingly, the ECL view suggests shifting the focus
to the mental models that communicators use, and
the neural mechanisms used to construct them, e.g.,
mental simulation.
What follows here adapts a relevant cognitive-
inspired framework from general AI to the present
NLU setting (§5.1), and discusses computational
challenges (§5.2). Note that similar insights have
been applied to multi-agent communication prob-
lems (Andreas et al., 2017), but their application to
general NLU has been limited.
5.1 Formal Framework
The recently introduced Consciousness Prior (CP;
Bengio, 2017) is a framework to represent the men-
tal model of a single agent, through the notion of
abstract state representations.6 Here, an abstract
state corresponds with s˜ (§4), a low-dimensional,
structured, interpretable state encoding, useful for
planning, communication, and predicting upcom-
ing observations (Franc¸ois-Lavet et al., 2019). One
example is a dynamic knowledge graph embedding
to represent a scene (Kipf et al., 2020).
5We use Liu et al. (2019b) with https://demo.
allennlp.org/textual-entailment/.
6For brevity we omit discussion of deriving abstract states
from the full mental state, see Bengio (2017) for details.
We adapt CP to a two-player cooperative lin-
guistic communication setting (Tomasello, 2008).
We assume a communicator (A) and recipient
(B), as shown in Fig. 3. The computational
problem of communicators is a “meeting of
minds” (Ga¨rdenfors, 2014), or achieving some
alignment of their mental models (Rumelhart,
1981; Stolk et al., 2016): the communicator A
wishes to induce in B some (possibly ordered) set
of goal abstract states G∗.
We leave exploration of the communicator side
to future work, and focus here on understanding.
We assume thatA sequentially generates utterances
ut ∈ U (we assume equivalence between utter-
ances u and observations o) using an utterance
model (Bengio, 2017). Analogously, B uses a
comprehension model C s.t., s˜t = C (s˜t−1, ut).
We assume that alignment is possible: there exists
some sequence of utterances that will induce G∗.
This framework is readily applicable to static
text (reading comprehension). For example, in
Fig. 1, G∗ would be the sequence of desired states,
and each sentence corresponds to an utterance
(u1 =“The world contains 2 crates.”,...).
5.2 Computational challenges of embodiment
We can now more precisely characterize the chal-
lenges that the recipient faces. At the root of the
problem is the embodiment principle (Lawrence,
2017): human internal representations and com-
putation capacity, as represented by s˜ and T˜ , re-
spectively, are many orders of magnitude larger
than their linguistic communication “bandwidth”.
We note that though s˜t is only a subspace of the
full mental state, following Stolk et al. (2016);
Bengio (2017) we assume that it still holds that
dim (s˜t)  dim (ut).The embodiment principle
dictates extreme economy in language use (Grice
et al., 1975), and results in three major challenges:
Common ground (prior world knowledge).
Meaning cannot be spelled out in words but rather
must be evoked in the listener (Rumelhart, 1981)
by assuming and exploiting common ground (Clark
and Schaefer, 1989; Tomasello, 2008), i.e., shared
structures of mental representations. In other
words, to achieve some aligned goal state g∗, the
communicators must rely heavily on pre-existing
similarities in s˜, a˜, and T˜ . Developing computa-
tional versions of human world models (T˜ ) is likely
AI-complete or close, but useful middle ground
may be attained by partial approximations.
Mental Model
 Intents
 
Linguistic 
Channel
Utterance Model
 Communicator
  
World State
 Recipient
C2
C2
"Remove all apples
from the second crate"
Comprehension
 
C1
1
2 3
4
Figure 3: Schema of linguistic communication framework. Communicator’s intent (1) is a high dimensional
mental state, i.e., remove apples from the second crate. The low capacity of the linguistic channel (2) leaves the
burden of understanding primarily on Communicator and Recipient (embodiment principle). The Recipient’s goal
is to understand (3), i.e., reconstruct the intent by integrating linguistic input, knowledge of the state of the world,
and internal knowledge (memories, commonsense). Reconstruction results in a successful alignment (4).
Common ground (discourse). In the context of
discourse, new information must be accumulated
efficiently to update the mental model (Clark and
Schaefer, 1989; Stolk et al., 2016). Consider “Re-
move all apples from the second crate” (Figure 1).
Full comprehension is only possible in the context
of a sufficiently accurate mental model. Using our
previous notations, the comprehension of ut de-
pends both on the previous utterances u1:(t−1) and
intermediate mental model s˜t−1.
Abstract vs. Literal Language. Interpretation
of literal language is relatively straightforward –
it is the language first acquired by children, di-
rectly related to the physical world. However,
much of human language is more abstract, re-
lying on metaphors borne of embodiment. The
symbolic programming analog fails for utterances
like “these elections seem like a circus”. Sym-
bolic programming languages cannot handle non-
literal interpretations: how are elections like a
circus? This is related to selective analogical in-
ference (Gentner and Forbus, 2011), closely related
to ECL: not everything in the source domain (cir-
cus) is mapped to the target (elections). Humans
easily perceive the salient metaphoric mappings
(clown→candidate), but this feat remains ex-
tremely complex for machines.
6 Architecture Sketch
This section presents a schematic ECL-inspired ar-
chitecture towards the implementation of the com-
prehension model (C), which addresses the chal-
lenges presented in §5.2. Fig. 4 shows the proposed
architecture. For simplicity, the focus is on a static
reading comprehension setting, but the architecture
supports richer environments as well.
6.1 Environment
The environment provides an “interaction API” to
the agent, as well as the reward signal. The sup-
ported interaction may vary considerably depend-
ing on the task; for reading comprehension, it al-
lows structured access to the text while support-
ing flexible reading strategies (Yuan et al., 2019).
The flexibility is important for long documents,
where navigation may be required (Geva and Be-
rant, 2018). For executable semantic parsing, there
might be external systems to interact with besides
the text, such as a database (Liang et al., 2016).
6.2 Agent
The agent architecture approximates the important
ECL functions outlined in §4, and consists of four
main modules:
Memory. We distinguish between two forms of
memory, the first an episodic, short-term mental
model – the system’s current abstract state repre-
sentation (s˜t). The symbolic programming analog
is the execution trace of a program, containing the
states of relevant working variables at each execu-
tion step. Fig. 4 displays the updated mental model,
after the removal of the apples. Compiled knowl-
edge, or long-term memory, reflects highly famil-
iar object representations, behaviors and schemata,
such as common sense, intuitive psychology and
physics. The symbolic programming language
analogs of this are libraries; largely static, hierarchi-
cal and compositional repositories of functions and
Emulator
Natural
Language
Environment
Agent
"Remove all apples
from the second crate."
C2
Sub-g
oal 2
Read next sentence
Sem. parse
                                               Global Memory
Mental Model
(Short-term)
.
Compiled
Knowledge
(Long-term)
Action
"Library
functions"
 imports
Sub-g
oal 3
C2
C1
for	box	in	crate2:	remove	apples	from	box	
Parsing: high-level perception, control
Sub-g
oal 1
Figure 4: Architecture for comprehender (§5), demonstrated on a symbolic version of the example task of Fig.
1. The agent receives natural language input from the environment. The agent has global memory – short-term,
keeping track of the mental model of the world, and long-term, containing compiled knowledge (“library classes
and functions”). The parser interprets input to parse a˜t enacting mental simulation using emulator. The mental
model is then updated, ready for the next input. The sub-goals refer to the order in which components are learned
(as opposed to hard-coded) in our proposed roadmap (§7).
classes. In the course of language interpretation,
these libraries are “importable”: for the symbolic
example in Fig. 4, the parser might instantiate a
new variable of an imported type (e.g., crate2
= Container()). Both types of memory are
accessible for all components of the agent.
Parser. Abstraction of higher-level perception,
control, reasoning and linguistic functions. Han-
dles interpretation of new linguistic inputs based
on prior knowledge and the current mental state.
Consonant with the view of analogy-making as
a kind of higher-level perception or recogni-
tion (Mitchell, 1993), metaphoric inference is in-
volved in grounding a novel input ut into internal,
neural state representations s˜t, a˜t affording simu-
lation. See Fig. 4 and Fig. 2 for examples on literal
and non-literal language, respectively.
Emulator. Functionally similar to the executor
module in executable semantic parsing, but learned,
and obviously far greater in scale. This mod-
ule is an abstraction of neural emulation mecha-
nisms (T˜ ), representing a wide range of functions,
from lower-level motor control and imagery to
higher-level models used for planning and theory
of mind (Grush, 2004). It operates over the current
mental model and semantic parse from the parser.
The output is then an updated mental model.
Importantly, the proposed architecture is de-
signed to address the challenges outlined in §5.2;
compiled knowledge underlies human common
ground, the building blocks of s˜, a˜ and T˜ . Memory
and emulation are instrumental for accumulation
in discourse. The ability to understand abstract
language involves all modules in the system.
7 Implementation Roadmap
The architecture outlined in §6 is very ambitious;
its implementation requires much further research.
This section proposes a roadmap to this goal, identi-
fying three sub-goals (Fig. 4), presented in order of
increasing difficulty. Broadly speaking, the level of
difficulty is determined by which components are
assumed as given in the input (here this also means
they are hard-coded in a symbolic programming
language), and which must be learned.
7.1 Sub-goal 1: learning open-domain
simulation
Observing that literal language is close to the em-
bodied primitives level, its interpretation is simpler
(than that of non-literal language, see §4). There-
fore, in this phase, the emulator and compiled
knowledge are hard-coded; here the focus is learn-
ing the parser. In other words, this sub-goal focuses
on extending executable semantic parsing from rel-
atively narrow domains to handle more general
literal language on-the-fly, similarly to zero-shot
semantic parsing (Givoli and Reichart, 2019).
For the example in §2.1, the parser could be
expected to infer the types (boxes as containers,
fruits as objects) either by context (Yao et al. (2018)
explore a preliminary schema-based approach) or
explicit declarative language, using them to config-
ure the emulator to handle the specific required
problem setting (Tamari et al., 2020).
As in similar projects exploring embodied under-
standing (Pustejovsky and Krishnaswamy, 2016;
Baldridge et al., 2018), new simulator frame-
works must be developed. While full embodiment
calls for multiple modalities, the degree to which
it is required remains an important open ques-
tion (Lupyan and Lewis, 2019). Accordingly, and
for immediate applicability to purely textual NLU
problems we propose also focusing on the simpler
setting of interactive text (Nelson, 2005). Recent
research on text-based games shows how agents
can learn to “program” in such languages (Coˆte´
et al., 2019; Ammanabrolu and Riedl, 2019), and
how real language understanding problems can be
framed as executable semantic parsing using config-
urable text-based simulators (Tamari et al., 2019).
7.2 Sub-goal 2: learning to simulate
This phase assumes that the compiled knowledge is
given (hard-coded), and the parsing and emulator
modules are neural (learned). A hard-coded emula-
tor will likely be needed to train a learned emulator.
The learned event execution of Narayanan (1997)
provides a useful starting point towards computa-
tional models capable of such inference. In general,
learned simulation is relatively unexplored in the
context of natural language, though recent work
has explored it in a “blocks-world” instruction fol-
lowing setup (Gaddy and Klein, 2019). Outside
of NLU, learning structured world models is a
long-studied, fast-growing field in embodied AI
research (Schmidhuber, 1990; Ha and Schmidhu-
ber, 2018; Hamrick, 2019; Anand et al., 2019; Kipf
et al., 2020), and recently also in learned executors
for neural programming (Kant, 2018). We expect
much useful cross fertilization with these fields.
7.3 Sub-goal 3: learning compiled knowledge
This phase focuses on the component seemingly
hardest to learn – compiled knowledge. Out of
scope here is fully neural setting where all compo-
nents are jointly learned, as in continual learning
research (Parisi et al., 2019). Instead, we focus on
a simpler setting, in which the compiled knowledge
is learned but represented by symbolic code; i.e.,
learning the static code library underlying the sim-
ulation framework. This sub-goal is relevant for
training the parser (§7.1) as well as the emulator
(§7.2), and can be pursued in parallel to them.
In this setting, learning compiled knowledge is
closely related to automated knowledge base con-
struction (Winn et al., 2019) or frame induction
from text (QasemiZadeh et al., 2019). Our pro-
posed paradigm suggests enriching classic sym-
bolic knowledge representations (Speer et al., 2017)
to executable form (Tamari et al., 2020). Prelim-
inary steps in this direction are seen in inferen-
tial knowledge bases such as ATOMIC (Sap et al.,
2019), which provides limited execution logic us-
ing edges typed with if-then relations.
Alongside FrameNet and MetaNet, others have
collected schema and metaphor mappings, by learn-
ing them from large corpora (Beigman Klebanov
et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2018). Pastra et al.
(2011) built a database of concepts directly ground-
able to sensorimotor representations, primarily for
robotics applications.
8 Conclusions
This position paper has proposed an approach to
representation and learning based on the tenets of
ECL. The proposed architecture, drawing on con-
temporary cognitive science, aims to address key
limitations of current NLU systems through mental
simulation and grounded metaphoric inference. We
outlined major challenges and suggested a roadmap
towards realizing the proposed vision.
Growing empirical evidence shows that language
is intricately intertwined with a vast range of other
neural processes. Accordingly, this work suggests
a symbiotic view of cognitive science, embodied
AI, and computational linguistics. By sharing com-
mon foundational problems, these fields may better
share and co-evolve common solutions. Finally,
we believe that attaining deeper language under-
standing must be a large scale effort, beyond the
scope of any one research group. We hope that
the paradigm presented here will help provide co-
herence to such efforts. One of our main goals
was to stimulate a discussion; moving forward, we
welcome comments, feedback, and suggestions.
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